Reintegration of Local Communities Divided by Ethnic Conflict: Ethnically Mixed Municipalities in the Western Balkans by Petr Čermák
191
Original research article
Received: 21 November 2016
Reintegration of Local Communities Divided 
by Ethnic Conflict: Ethnically Mixed Municipalities 
in the Western Balkans 
PETR ČERMÁK
Department of International Relations and European Studies
Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic
Summary
The paper presents findings from the research on the intensity and quality of 
local inter-ethnic relations in the sample of five ethnically mixed Bosniak-
Croat-Serb municipalities in the Western Balkans region which were hit by 
the ethnic conflict in the 1990s. In each municipality, potential territorial, 
ideological and socio-economic cleavages are investigated. Directions of the 
identified cleavages are compared with the ethnic cleavage. Depending on 
the cross-cutting or reinforcing character of the recorded cleavages in rela-
tion to the ethnic structure, it is assessed how much of internal cohesion has 
been achieved among once belligerent ethnic groups in these unique micro-
regions. Findings show that reinforcing cleavages prevail in all three dimen-
sions, while cleavages cross-cutting the ethnic divisions are limited. While 
part of the reinforcing cleavages is inherited and naturally reflects the pre-war 
socio-political cleavages, others are directly caused by the war-time and post-
war nationalist politics of ethnic homogenization and as such are potentially 
manageable through the peacebuilding process.
Keywords: Ethnic Communities, Post-War Reconciliation, Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Croatia, Inter-ethnic Relations
1. Introduction
The recent history of the geopolitical space of the Western Balkans has been deter-
mined by re-emergence of the ethno-territorial conflicts.1 Since the early 1990s, an 
1 I am grateful to Mirjana Kasapović, Danijela Dolenec, Ružica Jakešević and Siniša Tatalović 
for their comments on my research and academic support during my research visit to the Fa-
culty of Political Sciences in Zagreb, Croatia, where I prepared the core of the research presented 
in this paper.
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upsurge of ethnic wars spread through the post-Yugoslav space resulting in tens of 
thousands of casualties and millions of refugees, and fundamentally changing the 
political, social and demographic structure of the historically volatile region. Be-
tween 1990 and 2001, seven distinct yet interdependent armed conflicts had been 
fought among 10 ethnically defined actors in the Balkans (Pettersson and Wallen-
steen, 2015). While different in their localization, duration and intensity, all these 
hostilities had one fundamental feature in common: the ethno-territorial charac-
ter of the actors’ incompatibility. From Croatian Vukovar, through Bosnian Sara-
jevo, Herzegovinian Mostar, Kosovar Drenica to Macedonian Tetovo, hostile eth-
nic groups were fighting for control over once shared territory. In all these cases, 
the hostilities were not only accompanied by but also carried out through massive 
forced displacements of population. Warring parties used ethnic cleansing either in 
violent or non-violent form as the core tool for fulfilling their political goals, which 
resulted in unforeseen socio-demographic consequences. Many villages, towns and 
whole regions that had been ethnically intermixed for centuries, were ethnically ho-
mogenized by war and post-war nationalist policies. Moreover, final resolution of 
conflicts and post-conflict settlements then often confirmed and legitimized these 
homogenising outcomes. 
The Yugoslav wars have generally led to the territorial division of once ethni-
cally intermixed population into homogenous ethno-territorial units separated by 
war-drawn borders. Croatia got rid of most of its historically significant Serb mi-
nority and became a true nation state (Carmichael, 2003; Mojzes, 2011; Mulaj, 
2008). Bosnia and Hercegovina has been internally divided along the ethnic lines 
among Bosniak, Croat and Serb semi-autonomous entities, cantons and municipali-
ties (Campbell, 1999; Hayden, 1993; 1996; Toal and Dahlman, 2011). Kosovo lost 
most of its Serb community whose remains now live mostly isolated in semi-au-
tonomous enclaves (Adelman and Barkan, 2011; Jenne, 2009). Overall, the whole 
geopolitical space of historical Catholic-Orthodox-Muslim coexistence and ethnic 
heterogeneity has undergone a process of ethnic homogenization and division into 
ethnically exclusive political entities. Internationally administered post-conflict sta-
bilization processes attempted to reverse the results of the ethnic cleansing and re-
store the pre-war heterogeneity through support of the refugee return. However, the 
actual impact of this process remained limited and brought only partial success (see 
Black, 2001; Jenne, 2010; Kříž and Čermák, 2014; Toal and Dahlman, 2011; Žíla, 
2014). Hence, as a direct consequence of the ethno-territorial conflicts of the 1990s, 
most of the region’s population now live in mono-ethnic political units with limited 
contact to other ethnic groups.
While most of once intermixed areas have been ethnically cleansed, rare is-
lands of ethnic heterogeneity can be found throughout the region today. Despite all 
mutual hostilities, ethnic cleansings and population transfers, there are places where 
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different ethnic groups live alongside each other. This brings us to important and 
universally relevant questions regarding the prospects for coexistence and social 
reintegration of hostile ethnic groups after violent conflict. Is sustainable coexist-
ence after war possible? Can a reintegration of war-divided society be achieved? 
Or, as Kaufmann (1996) suggests, the only option for restoring sustainable peace is 
the physical separation of communities into defendable territorial units? To contri-
bute to answering these questions, this study focuses on five cases of post-conflict 
micro-regions where the coexistence of once belligerent ethnic groups has been pre-
served. The main aim of the research is to investigate comprehensively the socio-
political situation in these areas and analyse the intensity and quality of local inter-
ethnic relations. This approach shall contribute to answering the above-introduced 
question and as such has high relevance both for theory and political practice. 
From the theoretical point of view, this research has ambition to be an empiri-
cally based contribution to the ongoing debate about prospects for sustainable inter-
ethnic coexistence after ethnic conflict.2 In the field of policy implications, findings 
of this research are potentially relevant for peacebuilding strategies both within 
the Western Balkans region and in other post-conflict areas. Since the mutual rela-
tions among nations in the post-Yugoslav region have generally remained tense on 
the nation level as well as in many local communities, experience of multi-ethnic 
communities could serve as a useful guideline for other regions. Likewise, such an 
experience has also its general relevance for structurally similar areas in geographi-
cally different post-conflict zones. Thus, the question relevant for many other local 
communities, the three nations in general and the whole geopolitical space of the 
Western Balkans as well as for other post-conflict regions in the world is whether 
the once belligerent ethnic groups in these unique areas succeed in peaceful coexist-
ence, cooperation and reintegration of society. 
2. Theoretical Background
Without any exaggeration, the 20th century can be considered a century of national-
ism and nation state. Old-fashioned multi-ethnic empires, modern colonial realms 
as well as multi-national socialist federations, all one after the other split apart into 
ethnically homogenous nation-states. Shifts of political frontiers in Europe, Africa 
or Asia during the 20th century well illustrate the process of territorial fragmenta-
tion of multi-national entities into smaller national units. Consequently, this trans-
formation of the international system was accompanied by a great record of ethno-
territorial conflict. Since 1945, internal wars, most of them ethno-territorial, have 
2 This debate was opened by controversial works of Kaufman (1996); since then, among others, 
Ayres (2000), Laitin (2004), Pischedda (2008) or Sambanis (2000) have contributed to it.
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outweighed the traditional form of interstate conflict, and their incidence, duration 
and intensity have been continually rising (Cederman, Min, and Wimmer, 2010; 
Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Scherrer, 1994). This trend culminated in the 1990s when 
a new wave of ethno-territorial wars flared up in the Balkans, the post-Soviet space 
and Africa. Again, new nation states have arisen from these conflicts. While some 
of the volatile regions have been stabilized since then, the most recent cases of on-
going conflicts in the Middle East or Caucasus confirm the persisting relevance of 
the ethno-territorial conflict in the 21st century. Does the violent historical record 
of separation imply that peaceful coexistence of different ethnic groups on a shared 
territory is impossible and their separation into national units is the only solution? 
Fortunately, the answer offered by the state of research is not so sceptical.
The theories of conflict and peace have brought no clear agreement regarding 
a direct or even causal effect of ethnic heterogeneity on the presence or absence 
of violent conflict. Quantitative regression analysis of modern conflicts and eth-
nic heterogeneity of the involved societies have brought no clear picture (see i.a. 
Bleaney and Dimico, 2009; Collier, Honohan, and Moene, 2001; Ellingsen, 2000; 
Fearon and Laitin, 2003). More robust findings have been achieved when the rela-
tive strength of respective ethnic communities has been considered through the eth-
nic polarization index (see Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005; 2010). However, 
probably the most universal and useful theoretical framework has been introduced 
by Blimes (2006) who, assuming the multi-causal character of violent conflicts, an-
alysed the ethnic diversity as an indirect catalyst factor for escalation of the violent 
conflict. He reached a quite robust conclusion that ethnically heterogeneous com-
munities are more vulnerable to other potential primary causes of internal conflict. 
Hence, the general assumption that more divided societies have less ability to deal 
with challenges has been largely confirmed.
Thus, the crucial question for the stability of ethnically heterogeneous com-
munities is how much they are actually divided along the ethnic lines. In this re-
gard scholars are speaking about the conceptual continuum between coexistence 
and cohesion (Lederach, 1997; Bloomfield, 2006; Clark, 2009). While communities 
merely coexisting, even peacefully, next to each other would have smaller ability 
to deal with potential causes of conflict, integrated ethnic communities would have 
better prospects to accommodate such challenges. Accepting these theoretical as-
sumptions, to assess the community’s prospects for sustainable stability, we need 
to assess the actual level of its internal division and integration. Very useful for 
this purpose is the theoretical framework of multiple cleavages, introduced first by 
Lipset and Rokkan (1967). 
Cleavages are generally understood as “a specific kind of division, one that is 
distinctive because of its shape or source” (Zuckerman, 1975: 231). The more pre-
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cise concept of political cleavage is then defined by Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 1-9) 
as a social division possibly leading to diverging preferences, hence potentially be-
coming politicized.3 Lipset and Rokkan also formulated a theory of particular clea-
vages that are, as they argue, central to the modern European political systems. 
Their study, grounded in the historical analysis of the political development of 
Western Europe, identified two main dimensions of a cleavage: territorial and func-
tional. Within the former, two particular cleavages have developed through modern 
history: the division between centre and periphery and between urban and rural 
areas. In the functional dimension, divisions between the church and the state and 
between capital and workers have dominated. 
Nowadays, most scholars agree that the Lipset-Rokkan model fits well to the 
modern political environment in Western Europe, but it is hardly applicable in other 
geographical or historical contexts since different political environments have been 
historically formed by different factors. Hence, authors are pointing out that it is 
problematic to use the four standard categories of cleavages for an analysis of po-
litical developments in post-Communist countries that are transforming into demo-
cratic systems since these are formed by spatially and temporally specific factors 
(Kitschelt, 1995; Hloušek, 2000). This limit is even more pronounced in societies 
that are not only transforming from an authoritarian to a democratic system but 
simultaneously also from conflict to peace, such as is the case of societies in the 
Western Balkans (Henjak et al., 2013). 
In response to these limits, some scholars tried to adapt the Lipset-Rokkan 
model to fit better to the specific political environment of the transforming Central 
and Eastern European countries or post-conflict area of the Western Balkans. Some 
of them attempted to develop rather precise categories of cleavages that are cen-
tral to the politics of transforming countries, focusing narrowly on the specific is-
sues in transforming party systems (i.a. Markus, 1993; Ágh, 1998). Others, such as 
Deegan-Krause (2006), Beyme (1994), Kitschelt (1995) or Zakošek (1998), rather 
tried to adapt the original Lipset-Rokkan model in a more general way that would 
be applicable universally and would not so much depend on the specific historical 
determinants of Western Europe. 
Kitschelt (1995) focuses more generally on three dimensions of politicized so-
cial conflict: over boundaries of citizenship, over type of political governance, and 
over distribution of resources. Similarly, Zakošek (1998), in accordance with Čular 
and Gregurić (2007), adapting the Lipset-Rokkan framework specifically for the 
case of Croatia, uses a simplified model based on three main dimensions of the 
3 For more in-depth conceptualization of political cleavage, see Zuckerman (1975) or Rae and 
Taylor (1970).
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political division. The first is the territorial-cultural, which on the state level con-
centrates on the question of territorial and cultural borders of the polity (Zakošek, 
1998; Bagić, 2007). The second dimension is ideological-cultural, concentrating 
around the issue of national identity and its inclusive or exclusive character (Čular 
and Gregurić, 2007). The third dimension is then socio-economic and is stemming 
from the conflict over allocation of economic resources (ibid.). Due to its flexibility 
and feasible applicability to the environment of transforming societies, this three-
dimensional model will be used in the subsequent analysis. Thus, in the ethnically 
mixed areas, potential territorial, ideological and socio-economic cleavages will be 
identified and analysed.
Naturally, any modern political community can be described by several politi-
cally relevant cleavages characterizing the territorial, ideological or socio-econom-
ic divisions within the society. Important for the assessment of internal coherence 
of the community are the mutual relations between these divisions. While mutually 
reinforcing cleavages go along the same dividing lines and hence reinforce the di-
vision of respective communities, cross-cutting cleavages go across other dividing 
lines, thus weakening the relevance of other divisions within the society and sup-
porting cohesion of the community.4
Many scholars have suggested that cross-cutting cleavages are the factor which 
can bring stability and peace into divided societies, while reinforcing cleavages en-
hance the risk of internal conflict (see, among others, Coser, 1956; Lipset, 1960; 
Rae and Taylor, 1970; Simmel, 1964). However, this has been disputed by Lijphart 
(1975) with his well-known theory of consociationalism. In the case of the Ne-
therlands, where two main social groups have been fully divided throughout history, 
Lijphart showed that managed reinforcing cleavages can work as a key to political 
stability in a deeply divided society. Hence, Lijphart’s work opened a long-standing 
theoretical dispute about the assumption of the stabilizing effect of cross-cutting 
cleavages on one hand and the threatening consequences of reinforcing cleavages 
on the other.
Despite the great attention devoted to Lijphart’s theory in the last decades, 
there is still a wide part of the research focusing on the reconciling effect of cross-
cutting cleavages on divided societies.5 As stated by Zuckerman (1975: 241), these 
4 For a theoretical and methodological discussion of the concept of cross-cutting cleavage, see 
Selway (2011b).
5 Among other studies, Joel Selway (2011a; 2011b) presents a quantitative evidence of the im-
portance of cross-cutting cleavages as factors reducing the risk of internal conflict and raising the 
prospects for economic growth. Similarly, Gubler and Selway (2012) proved that mobilization 
for an armed conflict is more difficult in societies with cross-cutting cleavages. Kustov (2015) 
used a quantitative modelling of ‘artificial societies’ to test the stabilizing effect of cross-cutting 
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arguments are: “(...) linking a cross-cutting cleavage membership pattern with po-
litical conflict characterized by bargaining, compromise, stability and the absence 
of violence. A reinforcing cleavage system is associated with intensely held politi-
cal attitudes, extremist positions, inability to compromise, instability and violence.”
The suggested causal mechanism is then explained by Dunning and Harrison 
(2010: 21):
When individuals who are members of the same group or social category in one 
dimension of interest or identity, such as ethnicity, are members of different groups 
in another dimension, such as social class, their competing interests in the second 
dimension may undercut their primary allegiance to interests arising in the first 
dimension. Cross-cutting cleavages can thereby inhibit the extent to which politi-
cal alignments intensify along any single dimension.
Setting the research design of this paper into the theoretical framework intro-
duced above, the research will first identify potential cleavages in the three struc-
tural dimensions and then assess their reinforcing or cross-cutting character in re-
gard to the ethnic cleavage. By comparing directions of recorded cleavages, it will 
be found if these ethnically heterogeneous areas are actually functioning rather in 
the mode of mere coexistence or the local communities have undergone deeper re-
integration and reached social cohesion, which gives them better prospects for long-
term stability according to our theoretical assumptions.
3. Sample Selection and Research Methods
Methodologically, the research is compiled as a multiple case study with case de-
fined as a multi-ethnic post-conflict environment. Considering the above-presented 
empirical record of prevailing ethnic separation, both in the Western Balkans region 
and in the international system in general, such cases can be considered as devi-
ant cases (Gerring, 2007). Cases of ethnically mixed communities that withstood 
an ethnic conflict in their area and managed to coexist after such a conflict deviate 
both from recorded prevailing empirical trends as well as from some of the related 
theoretical arguments (e.g. Kaufmann, 1996). According to Seawright and Gerring 
(2008), study of deviant cases can not only explore new explanations for unusual 
outcomes but also disconfirm a deterministic argument. While directly related to the 
theory, this study is formulated mostly in intrinsic terms since it assumes that re-
cleavages. Bulutgil (2015) proved on the empirical record that cross-cutting social and ethnic 
cleavages decrease the risk of ethnic cleansing in a conflict. Finseraas and Jakobsson (2012) 
proved the stabilizing effect of cross-cutting religious cleavage. Furthermore, Robertson and 
Pop-Eleches (2011), Dunning and Harrison (2010) or Case (2015) conducted more case-specific 
research on the effects of cross-cutting cleavages focusing on single societies in transition.
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search of multi-ethnic communities has a great impact as such, above all in the field 
of policy implications. If once belligerent ethnic communities in these areas suc-
ceed in reintegration of the society, their experience could be used for much needed 
universal guidelines applicable in the reintegration processes in other post-conflict 
environments.
The sample of cases included in the study was selected on precise criteria cor-
responding with the logic of the deviant case selection methods. To clearly deline-
ate the borders of a case, the primary unit of analysis is defined as municipality. 
Municipalities are, in the regional context of former Yugoslavia, supposed to repre-
sent the lowest socio-political unit which is functionally coherent and institutionally 
self-governed. The population of cases was limited to municipalities located in the 
post-conflict area of Bosnia and Hercegovina and parts of Croatia. This reduction 
was done in accordance to the logic of deviant case selection. First, from the macro-
level point of view, this region has historically been the centre of cultural and ethnic 
intermixing of Catholic, Orthodox and Muslim (Ottoman) influences with a high 
level of ethnic heterogeneity prior to the recent conflict. Second, this area was hit 
most intensively by the ethno-territorial conflicts and consequent separation in the 
early 1990s. Third, the regional conflict incompatibility was based on a highly com-
plex trilateral structure with three ethnic groups and their sub-actors involved. All 
these factors combined suggest that cases of persisting ethnic heterogeneity highly 
deviate from the norm.
To define the sample of multi-ethnic municipalities within the population of 
cases, two quantitative criteria were set. First, to be considered as multi-ethnic, 
all three ethnic groups have to be settled in the municipality and represent at least 
5% of its population. Second, the ethnic structure of the local population needs to 
be truly heterogeneous, implying relatively equal representation of all three ethnic 
groups. The level of ethnic heterogeneity was assessed using the measure of ethno-
linguistic fractionalisation.6 Cases of municipalities performing value of ELF above 
0.5 were considered as multi-ethnic for further research.
In contrast to the pre-war era when local ethnic heterogeneity was a character-
istic feature of the region, nowadays there can be found only few places matching 
our criteria. A quick comparison of pre-war demographic data and recent estimates 
illustrates clearly the homogenization process recorded in the last decades on the 
local level. As Table 1 shows, the average level of ELF for municipalities in both 
Croatia and Bosnia dropped significantly as well as the number of areas matching 
6 The measure of ethno-linguistic fractionalisation (ELF) reflects the probability that two indi-
viduals randomly chosen from the sample belong to different sub-samples (ethnic groups in our 
case). For more details and discussion on its advantages and limits in conflict research, see Mon-
talvo and Reynal-Querol (2005).
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our criteria. Generally, it is clear that a substantial part of the pre-war local Bosniak-
Croat-Serb ethnic diversity has been lost since 1990.7
In contrast to the original 37 multi-ethnic municipalities in 1991, only 5 such 
areas can be found through the region today. The five micro-regions can be consi-
dered as the last remains of the historical Bosniak-Croat-Serb local ethnic heteroge-
neity. The territorial distribution of these units and their basic demographic charac-
teristics are presented in Figure 1 (on the next page).
In each of the five ethnically heterogeneous municipalities, the author conduct-
ed in-depth study of local socio-political structures. Based on the analytical frame-
work presented above, the research first identified relevant cleavages in the three 
introduced dimensions and then assessed their cross-cutting or reinforcing character 
in respect to the ethno-religious cleavage. A wide range of primary and secondary 
sources including 26 semi-structured interviews8 with local political, religious and 
NGO representatives were used and triangulated to reach a valid and reliable as-
sessment.
The analysis of cleavages identified in the ethnically mixed municipalities is 
presented in the following chapters. These are organized according to the three di-
mensions of cleavages that have been analysed. First, territorial cleavages are dis-
cussed focusing primarily on the spatial distribution and concentration of popula-
tion on the territory of municipalities. Second, ideological cleavages are analysed 
with the emphasis on the diverging political preferences within the societies in re-
gard to the definition of the nation. Third, socio-economic cleavages are discussed 
in purpose to discover potential economic disparities. Directions of identified di-
viding lines are compared with the ethnic cleavage. Hence, for each of the identi-
fied cleavages, its cross-cutting or reinforcing character is defined. On the basis of 
7 For calculation of ELF for the pre-war period, data from the last Yugoslav census conducted 
in 1991 are used. The contemporary data are taken from most recent censuses conducted in 2011 
in Croatia and 2013 in BaH.
8 A list of all interviews with basic information about respondents can be found in the refe-
rences.
Table 1. Decrease of Bosniak-Croat-Serb Local Ethnic Heterogeneity in BaH 
and Croatia Since 19917
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these findings, levels of both social division and cohesion can be evaluated in each 
municipality.
4. Territorial Cleavage
Within the three-dimensional model of cleavage introduced above, the territori-
al cleavage is understood above all as the conflict about definition of the borders 
of the state including the conflict between centre and periphery, ethnic majority 
and minority, and centralization and decentralization (Bagić, 2007: 95; Čular and 
Gregurić, 2007: 5). Hence, of the three principal cleavages, the territorial cleavage 
is most determined by the objective geographic and demographic reality. Since the 
territorial cleavage in its original understanding is to a great extent intended for 
state-level analysis, it was partly modified and simplified for its usage on the lo-
Figure 1. Sample of Multi-ethnic Municipalities Encompassed by the Research


































cal level. For the purpose of this research, which is to compare the ethnic cleavage 
with other potential cleavages, the territorial cleavage is limited to the mere spatial 
dimension. Hence, the investigation of the territorial cleavage is focusing on the 
Croatian Political Science Review, Vol. 53, No. 4, 2016, pp. 191-229
202
territorial distribution and concentration of population within the territory of mu-
nicipalities, distinguishing between central and peripheral areas.9 These features are 
then compared with the directions of ethnic cleavage. If members of different ethnic 
groups live intermixed equally across the whole territory of the entity, the territorial 
cleavage fully cross-cuts the ethnic one. On the contrary, if ethnic groups live sepa-
rated in spatially delineated regions, or even divided between centre and periphery, 
the territorial cleavage reinforces the ethnic one.
To assess the territorial cleavage, in-depth analysis of demographic develop-
ment and current situation was carried out for all five municipalities. Its results are 
presented in Table 2 and Figures 2-6 that show in chronological order the develop-
ment of the ethno-territorial structure on the territory of the five municipalities from 
the pre-war period until today.
To understand the current ethno-territorial situation in the post-conflict areas 
under our examination, it is important to take into account the pre-war situation and 
its war-related changes. Therefore, the overview of the pre-war ethno-territorial si-
tuation is presented as a starting point in Table 2. As can be seen in the third column, 
not all of today’s heterogeneous municipalities were ethnically diverse prior to the 
war. While areas of Brčko and Vukosavlje in Bosnian Posavina had been histori-
cally intermixed with high shares of all three groups, the other three municipalities 
had been more homogenous than today. In Glamoč and Vojnić, the now numerous 
Croat communities were missing and shares of Bosniaks were lower, which is also 
the case of Topusko. Hence, the contemporary heterogeneous ethnic structure is de-
termined by the conflict and subsequent demographic shifts rather than by history 
of coexistence in these areas (this issue will be further discussed below).
It is also important to emphasize, as the first set of maps in Figure 2 shows, that 
prior to the war, the ethnic communities lived territorially concentrated and to a cer-
tain extent separated in ethnically homogenous areas. This was most pronounced in 
peripheral and marginal rural areas that, historically, had been mostly ethnically ho-
mogenous with mono-ethnic villages. Exceptions were mostly limited to some pe-
ripheral areas neighbouring to urban centres. Another exception are southern margin 
areas in Topusko and Vojnić which had been becoming mixed Serb-Bosniak since 
the 1960s as a result of modern economic migration (Škiljan, n.d.). Quite different 
was the situation in urban parts that functioned as centres of economic and social 
life during history and as such had become more ethnically diverse than peripheral 
rural parts. Besides the town of Vojnić that was historically homogenously Serb, 
urban centres had been the actual centres of ethnic intermixture on the local level.
9 The categorization frequently used in the field of economic geography distinguishing centre, 
periphery and margins is used to conceptualize this distinction (for a thorough discussion, see 
Leimgruber, 2004).
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Figure 2. Ethno-territorial Structure of Municipalities in 1991 and 2016: Brčko
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Figure 3. Ethno-territorial Structure of Municipalities in 1991 and 2016: Glamoč
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Figure 4. Ethno-territorial Structure of Municipalities in 1991 and 2016: Topusko
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Figure 5. Ethno-territorial Structure of Municipalities in 1991 and 2016: Vojnić
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Figure 6. Ethno-territorial Structure of Municipalities in 1991 and 2016: Vukosavlje
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The conflict in the early 1990s brought fundamental changes in the ethno-terri-
torial structure of all the municipalities. As already discussed above, due to its eth-
no-territorial character, the conflict was not only accompanied but also carried on 
by forced displacements of particular ethnic groups with the purpose of ethnic ho-
mogenization of the territory by the controlling side. As a result, displacements led 
to an almost total ethnic homogenization of the population in all areas already in the 
initial phase of the conflict (see the fourth column). Besides violent or non-violent 
cleansing of minority groups, homogeneity was further reinforced through influx 
of refugees or IDPs from other parts of the conflict zone. In the cases of Glamoč, 
Vojnić and Topusko, the ethnic homogenization was carried out even twice dur-
ing the conflict, first by the Serb side in the initial phase of the war and then by the 
Croat side at the end of the conflict. Hence, these three municipalities had almost 
no civilian population when the fighting ceased, while the other two were ethnically 
homogenous (see the fifth column in Table 2, p. 201).
Once the open conflict was over, the international community attempted to re-
verse the results of the ethnic cleansings and homogenization through its pressure 
for the refugee return with emphasis on those groups that were in the position of 
minority in the respective areas (see Black, 2001; Toal and Dahlman, 2011; Žíla, 
2014). However, the process of return was complicated in all areas not only due 
to the persisting insecurity and inter-ethnic mistrust caused by the war, but also to 
strong influx of refugees and IDPs belonging to the ruling ethnic group. The muni-
cipalities of Glamoč and Vojnić, where almost no Croats lived prior to the conflict, 
recorded a strong influx of Croat refugees and IDPs from other parts of Bosnia, who 
immediately became the clear majority in almost deserted territories. The situation 
was similar in some parts of Vukosavlje and Brčko where Serb IDPs reinforced the 
Serb ethnic dominance. Due to a combination of all these obstacles, the return of 
minority refugees, which was supposed to reverse the ethnic homogenization, did 
not start for several years after the war. 
Eventually, the process of refugee return brought different results for different 
ethnic communities (see the sixth column). Some communities (mostly but not ex-
clusively Bosniak) returned almost fully to their pre-war homes and thus reclaimed 
their original share of population. On the other hand, most non-Bosniak communi-
ties (above all Serb) returned in much lower numbers with mostly older generations 
coming back for permanent living. Some pre-war communities returned in almost 
negligible number that does not fully guarantee their long-term existence in the area. 
Despite these limits, the process of refugee return resulted in a (re-)emergence of at 
least temporary ethnic intermixture in all five municipalities (see the current ethnic 
structure in the seventh column in Table 2, p. 201). 
What is important in regard to the territorial cleavage is the difference between 
urban centres and rural peripheral and marginal areas in ethnic heterogeneity, which 
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was confirmed or even reinforced by the war-related population shifts. Hence, simi-
larly to the pre-war situation, rural areas are today again mostly ethnically homo-
genous since only the pre-war homogenous population or a part thereof has returned 
there. On the other hand, urban centres and some previously intermixed rural areas 
have partly preserved their heterogeneity since members of all pre-war groups have 
returned there. Moreover, the new influx of IDPs and refugees was mostly directed 
into the urban areas, which have thereby further strengthened their ethnic diversity. 
Hence, the town of Glamoč became mixed Croat-Serb-Bosniak instead of Bosniak-
Serb prior to the war, and Vojnić became Serb-Croat instead of homogenously Serb. 
However, despite some degree of heterogeneity reached in urban centres and adjacent 
areas, due to the prevailing rural character of all municipalities, a great part of the 
population again lives territorially divided in mono-ethnic areas today (see the second 
set of maps in Figures 2-6). There is also a significant difference among ethnic groups 
in regard to their concentration in different types of space. While only Serbs usually 
live equally dispersed across the territory and its different types, the presence of Bos-
niaks and Croats is often concentrated either to urban centres or to rural peripheries 
or margins. These features then have direct implications for the cross-cutting charac-
ter of socio-economic cleavage which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
Overall, in relation to the ethnic cleavage, the reinforcing shape of territorial 
cleavage prevails. The turbulent developments of the last two decades had fully dif-
ferent demographic consequences for different ethnic groups. Single ethnic commu-
nities have gone through their own specific demographic development mostly iso-
lated from other communities. As a result, we can now speak of communities divided 
over the territorial and demographic dimension, which has further consequences for 
their contemporary demographic and socio-economic prospects (see Chapter 6). 
From the territorial point of view, cleavages cross-cutting the ethnic lines are gene-
rally limited to the ethnic intermixture of urban centres and some surrounding pe-
ripheral areas. Besides these, reinforcing territorial cleavages prevail since a great 
part of the population is settled in mono-ethnic rural areas. Moreover, the reinfor-
cing character of the territorial cleavage is further underlined by frequent concentra-
tion of ethnic groups into a single type of space (urban centre or rural periphery and 
margins) which has significant consequences for their socio-economic situation and 
the cleavage related to it. 
Importantly, the recorded features generally cannot be understood solely as 
a consequence of the war and post-war politics of ethnic homogenization. They 
should be rather considered as a reversal to the pre-war general situation in predomi-
nantly rural areas that had historically been mono-ethnic. The war-related displace-
ments of population have eventually even led to a higher level of ethnic intermix-
ture. Ironically, the level of ethnic heterogeneity in areas under our examination was 
strengthened as a consequence of ethnic homogenization in other conflict zones.
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5. Ideological Cleavage
According to the three-dimensional model of cleavage introduced above, the ideo-
logical cleavage is concentrated around the problem of defining the national iden-
tity, its exclusive or inclusive character, and the definition of the nation and the 
polity in general. As such, it is less determined by objective spatial categories than 
the territorial cleavage yet still deeply rooted in the historical development of the 
society. Hence, the ideological cleavage reflects dealing with crucial questions of 
modern political history – the relation between religious and secular, tradition and 
modernity or, most importantly in the post-conflict context of the Western Balkans, 
nationalist and universalist (Henjak et al., 2013: 457; Bagić, 2007: 95; Čular and 
Gregurić, 2007: 5). 
For the purpose of this research, the intensity and direction of ideological 
cleavage is assessed through the voting behaviour of citizens in state-level elec-
tions. The reason for such an approach rests in the character of the state-level po-
litical scene in BaH and Croatia, which is to a great extent concentrated around the 
issues of the definition of the nation (see Stojarová and Emerson, 2013). All major 
parties have a clear position in regard to this primary ideological conflict. Major 
political parties competing in state-level elections both in BaH and Croatia can be 
categorized in this dimension and, through their election support, ideological pre-
ferences of local populations can be estimated with a relatively high precision. 
Both in BaH and in Croatia, voters can choose from different political options in 
respect to their preferred definition of the nation as a political community. These 
options are ranging from non-ethnic parties through moderate ethnically oriented 
parties to ethnically exclusive nationalist parties. The following analysis is using 
the categorization introduced by Bieber (2006: 104-105), who classifies political 
parties in the post-ethnic-conflict political environment of BaH into four basic ca-
tegories depending on their position on ethnicity and multi-ethnicity. On the most 
nationalist pole are extreme nationalist parties advocating change of status quo 
(parties from this category are absent or irrelevant in the examined areas). Less 
extreme are established national parties engaging in cooperation with each other 
and operating within the status quo. Moderate national parties follow these on 
the continuum with stronger commitment to cross-national co-operation, but well-
defined commitment to only one community at the same time. Most multi-ethnic 
are the non-national parties, which “do not have a group-specific programme and 
potentially appeal to more than one group” (ibid.: 105). Incorporating this catego-
rization into our framework, support of the non-national option across different 
ethnic groups would represent an ideal cross-cutting cleavage in respect to ethnic 
division. On the other hand, division of voters’ support along the ethnic lines rein-
forces the ethnic cleavage. 
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To estimate the intensity and shape of the ideological cleavage, the support for 
these categories of parties in different ethnic communities was analysed in the five 
municipalities. Firstly, the prevailing political preferences within particular ethnic 
communities were investigated through interviews with their representatives. Se-
cond, the preliminary estimates gathered through information from interviews were 
controlled through in-depth analysis of election results in the last state-level elec-
tions10 taking into account the territorial distribution of votes among single polling 
stations and the territorial distribution of ethnic communities. 
Results of this analysis are presented in Table 3 that shows the estimated dis-
tribution of voting support within ethnic communities among the main ideological 
categories of political parties. These values indicate the prevailing ideological pre-
ferences in respect to the crucial question of the definition of the nation. For each 
municipality, the distribution of votes for respective categories of parties is shown 
for single ethnic communities in respective lines. Parties are divided into three ca-
tegories (columns) introduced above. Percentages in single cells show estimated 
10 These are the 2015 parliamentary elections in Croatia and the 2014 general elections in BaH 
where voting to Parliamentary Assembly of BaH, the National Assembly of the Republic of Srp-
ska, the Parliament of the Federation of BaH and the Assembly of Canton 10 were taken into 
account.
Table 3. Distribution of Support for Political Options among and within Ethnic 
Communities
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support for the category within the respective ethnic community (line) with major 
parties of the category indicated in brackets.
The above-presented estimates of voting support indicate that the distribution 
of ideological preferences among and within ethnic groups highly differs between 
municipalities in BaH and those in Croatia. In BaH municipalities, citizens are fully 
divided by ethnic lines in their voting with almost no overlap of support for a sin-
gle category of parties at all. While there are some active non-ethnic parties seeking 
support from all three communities in BaH, this category is supported solely by a 
slighter part of Bosniak voters, which eventually undermines their legitimacy as a 
non-ethnic option. The rest of the society is voting solely for the ethnically based 
options. While ethnically oriented Bosniaks and Serbs are divided into a smaller 
part supporting moderate ethnic parties and a larger part voting for nationalist par-
ties, the support of Croat voters is fully concentrated into the nationalist category. 
Hence, it is clear that the society in the three multi-ethnic municipalities in BaH is 
fully divided along the ethnic lines in their ideological preferences.
The situation in municipalities in Croatia is then fully different from that in 
BaH. Both in Vojnić and Topusko, the significant part of all three ethnic communi-
ties prefers the non-ethnic option, with the share being higher in the Serb (60-70%) 
and Bosniak (40-90%) communities and lower in the Croat community (around 
25%). The rest of Croat and Serb voters is voting for their respective national par-
ties. The situation of the ethnically oriented Bosniak community is rather specific – 
their support is divided between Bosniak national parties and Croat national HDZ. 
Overall, it is clear that, in contrast to the situation in Bosnian municipalities, the 
political preferences in municipalities in Croatia are cross-cutting the ethnic lines, 
and the ideological division between ethnic and non-ethnic understanding of nation 
and polity is much more pronounced.
Some of the ideological and political divisions can be understood as a natural 
continuation of the pre-war division of society, such as higher support for post-
Communist SDP by Serbs in municipalities in Croatia, who were more loyal to the 
pre-war regime, and the opposite by Croats. However, most of the recorded divi-
sions in ideological preferences are undoubtedly direct consequences of war and 
post-war nationalist political mobilization. It is obvious that this factor now has a 
much lower impact in the Croatian political environment where the non-ethnic op-
tion gained legitimacy in all three ethnic communities and as such created an im-
portant cleavage cross-cutting the ethnic division. On the contrary, in the still na-
tionalist-dominated political environment of BaH this option has only weak support 
solely within Bosniak communities, which reversely limits its legitimacy for other 
communities and its non-ethnic essence in general.
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6. Socio-economic Cleavage
Contrary to the two above-introduced structural cleavages, the socio-economic 
cleavage is rather a functional category reflecting the economic reality. As such 
it is much less pre-determined by the given spatial and deeply rooted ideological 
categories and is more prone to structural changes. As noted above, in the three-di-
mensional model the socio-economic cleavage is understood not solely in its origi-
nal meaning as the division between capital and workers, but in a more general 
meaning as any conflict about allocation of economic resources (Bagić, 2007: 95). 
As stated by Čular and Gregurić (2007: 5): “This cleavage can take different forms 
depending on the existing distribution of resources and on dominant mechanisms 
of allocation in the status quo”. Using this more open-ended conception, any poten-
tial economic disparities within societies in the five municipalities were identified 
through the research and their shapes were compared to the direction of the ethnic 
cleavage. If members of a single ethnic community belong to different socio-eco-
nomic categories and meet members of other ethnic groups within these categories, 
then the socio-economic and ethnic cleavages cross-cut each other. On the contrary, 
if there is a significant overlap between ethnic group and socio-economic category, 
the two cleavages reinforce each other.
Before the actual analysis of the socio-economic cleavage, the general eco-
nomic situation in municipalities under examination needs to be briefly discussed. 
Besides the rural area of Vukosavlje, which has always been mostly agricultural 
without any production capacities and developed services, the economy of all mu-
nicipalities used to be based on a structural balance between several economic sec-
tors.11 However, the war destroyed much of the pre-war capacities in the secondary 
and tertiary sectors, and thus brought fundamental structural consequences for local 
economies. Nowadays, all municipalities still lack an important structural part of 
their pre-war economic capacities.12 After the decline of the secondary and related 
tertiary sectors, local economies are very much dependent on the quaternary sec-
tor based on public administration and goods, and the ‘real’ economy is limited to 
primary-sector activities concentrated on agriculture or forestry and the limited ter-
tiary sector of services. 
As a natural result of such structural imbalance in local economy, the general 
socio-economic situation is unsatisfactory in all municipalities and most people live 
11 For the purpose of the following analysis, the concept of economic sectors is used as defined 
by Kenessey (1987). According to him, the primary sector consists of agriculture, forestry, fish-
ing and mining, the secondary sector of construction and manufacturing, the tertiary sector of 
services and trade, and the quaternary sector of finance and public administration.
12 These are diverse industrial capacities in Brčko, food processing and woodworking capacities 
in Glamoč, once well-developed spa tourism in Topusko, and ceramic industry in Vojnić.
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Table 4. Socio-economic Disparities among Ethnic Communities
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on or even below the level of sustainable existence. Unemployment is high in all 
areas, especially among young people, which leads to the intensive economic emi-
gration of younger generations causing further negative economical consequences. 
Elder generations are often dependent on external sources of income in the form of 
pensions or remittances. Overall, all local actors agree that the current situation is 
hard for all ethnic groups since none of them is in a socio-economically sustainable 
position.
However, even in such an intensive economic hardship, there are significant 
differences among ethnic groups. Structural disparities have roots in differing de-
mographic and territorial positions of the ethnic communities as indicated by the 
data presented in Table 4 and Figures 7-11.
Firstly, there are significant differences in the relative demographic position of 
ethnic communities in regard to the population pyramid in all municipalities (see 
the third column of Table 4). These are mostly determined by the fate of the respec-
tive community during the conflict. Bosniak communities are relatively youngest 
in all cases regardless of their prior forced displacement and return. Communities 
that came to municipalities as IDPs or refugees from other areas are generally on 
local average (Croats in Glamoč and Vojnić, Serbs in Brčko and Vukosavlje). Most 
importantly, non-Bosniak ‘returnee’ communities are usually significantly older in 
relation to local average. This is the case of Croats who returned to Vukosavlje 
and Brčko and of Serbs who came back to Glamoč, Topusko and Vojnić. Natural-
ly, these features have important direct implications for economic productivity of 
these communities and their dependence on external incomes such as pensions and 
remittances.
Another important factor conducive to economic disparities among ethnic 
communities is the territorial distribution of the population. Maps in Figures 7-11 
show in more detail what was already mentioned in Chapter 4 – the urban-rural 
distribution and concentration of ethnic communities. In each municipality, there 
are clear differences among ethnic groups in regard to their concentration in either 
rural areas (distinguishing more interconnected peripheral areas and rather isolated 
margins) or urban centres. The maps indicate that many ethnic communities, above 
all those which are numerously weaker, are concentrated mostly in one category of 
space which in turn naturally limits their economic opportunities. Such a situation 
can be equally unfavourable for a community concentrated in rural margins and 
economically dependent solely on agriculture as for a community concentrated in 
urban areas which is reliant only on the tertiary or the quaternary sector.
These territorial characteristics, together with the demographic profile, largely 
determine the prevailing type of economic activity of respective communities, as 
can be seen in the fourth column of Table 4. Unsurprisingly, while predominantly 
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Figure 7. Territorial Concentration of Ethnic Communities in Different Economic 
Types of Space: Brčko
Čermák, P., Reintegration of Local Communities Divided by Ethnic Conflict...
217
Figure 8. Territorial Concentration of Ethnic Communities in Different Economic 
Types of Space: Glamoč
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Figure 9. Territorial Concentration of Ethnic Communities in Different Economic 
Types of Space: Topusko
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Figure 10. Territorial Concentration of Ethnic Communities in Different Economic 
Types of Space: Vojnić
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Figure 11. Territorial Concentration of Ethnic Communities in Different Economic 
Types of Space: Vukosavlje
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rural communities mostly concentrate their economic activity into the primary sec-
tor (agriculture), more urban-concentrated communities are oriented on the tertiary 
sector of services. Besides, relatively elder communities are less economically ac-
tive and much more dependent on external incomes.
Specific is the situation in the quaternary sector of public administration and, 
more generally, all the public goods. According to the law both of BaH and that of 
Croatia, all ethnic groups should be proportionally represented in the public sector. 
However, this is in fact true only in the case of Vukosavlje, where the public sector 
is very tiny, and in Brčko, where the law is strictly followed. In other three munici-
palities, Bosniak and Serb communities are underrepresented in the public sector 
while Croats who came or returned first into these areas after the war were in an 
advantaged position and are overrepresented in the public sector. Bosniak and Serb 
leaders in these areas are also pointing to the important role of Croats’ closer links 
to higher institutional structures (Republic of Croatia and Canton 10 in BaH) which 
are predominantly Croat and as such represent Croat interests, and directly or indi-
rectly close the public sector for non-Croats.
Overall, the recorded socio-economic cleavages are to a great extent reinfor-
cing the ethnic cleavage in all municipalities stemming from the demographic pro-
file and territorial distribution of particular ethnic communities. Many ethnic com-
munities appear in an economically disadvantaged situation either in the territorial 
(such as solely rural Bosniaks in Vojnić, or predominantly urban Croats in Glamoč) 
or the demographic (older Serbs in Glamoč) dimension. Most divisive and prob-
lematic are cases where these two disparities reinforce each other, which is the case 
of mostly older rural Croats in Vukosavlje and Serbs in Topusko. Another factor 
intensively deepening the socio-economic cleavage and its reinforcing character in 
relation to ethnicity is the limited access to the public sector for some communities.
While some of the identified demographic and territorial disparities can be re-
garded as a natural return to the pre-war situation (younger rural Bosniaks in Vojnić 
or rural concentration of Croats in Brčko), others are direct results of the war and 
post-war politics of ethnic cleansing and its consequences. Above all, this is the 
generally higher age of some communities and their territorial concentration as a 
result of ethnic cleansing and problematic return to pre-war homes and the politi-
cally motivated limited access to the public sector.
7. Conclusions and Policy Implications
This paper presented results of the research conducted in the last five remaining eth-
nically mixed Bosniak-Croat-Serb municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Croatia. Its aim was to analyse the quality and intensity of inter-ethnic relations and 
thus answer the both politically and theoretically highly relevant question if these 
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historically interconnected and recently belligerent ethnic communities can succeed 
in reintegration of the multi-ethnic society, or if they rather merely coexist next to 
each other. To discover and analyse relevant inter-ethnic relations and divisions, 
the research used the concept of cleavages, more specifically its adapted three-di-
mensional model focusing on territorial, ideological and socio-economic dimen-
sions of cleavages. Directions of the cleavages identified in these three dimensions 
were compared with the ethno-religious cleavage. In this way, the cross-cutting 
or reinforcing character of the particular cleavage was discovered. Accepting the 
theoretical assumption of the integrative and stabilizing effect of cross-cutting clea-
vages and the divisive effect of reinforcing cleavages, such an approach intended to 
answer the question of prospects of post-conflict multi-ethnic areas for long-term 
stability.
Unsurprisingly, the answer to this question is far from clear. Both cross-cutting 
and reinforcing cleavages were identified in all three dimensions. For the cross-cut-
ting side, part of the population lives territorially intermixed, there are cross-ethnic 
ideological preferences in some areas, and economic hardships go across the ethnic 
lines. However, reinforcing cleavages still prevail. A large part of population lives 
in mono-ethnic rural areas. Also, more citizens prefer ethnically exclusive ideologi-
cal options and, as a result, the society is to a great extent politically divided along 
ethnic lines. Even in the situation of general economic hardship, there are signifi-
cant socio-economic disparities among ethnic communities and many of them are 
relatively economically disadvantaged. 
According to our theoretical framework, such cleavages reinforcing the ethnic 
division could potentially become a catalyst of destabilizing processes; hence they 
represent an indirect and latent threat for the stability and general viability of multi-
ethnic areas. While part of the reinforcing cleavages shall be understood as a natural 
reversal to the pre-war socio-political reality that was also characterised by some re-
inforcing divisions, another part is clearly a direct consequence of the war-time and 
post-war nationalist politics of ethnic homogenization. To support the reintegration 
of the multi-ethnic society, these ‘new’ cleavages should attract our attention since 
they are, in contrast to deeply rooted inherited cleavages, potentially manageable 
within the ongoing peacebuilding process. 
Territorial cleavages are difficult to reverse since new patterns of settlement 
are given by hardly reversible conflict events and to a great extent reflect the pre-
war demographic situation. As such, the partly reinforcing character of the territo-
rial distribution of population shall now be accepted as the status quo. On the other 
hand, the reinforcing cleavages in the ideological and socio-economic dimension 
offer much more space for an outside intervention. In regard to ideological prefe-
rences, the cases of Croatian municipalities show that a civic-oriented political op-
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tion is able to reach wide legitimacy and support in an otherwise ethnically divided 
society, and thereby considerably cross-cut the ethnic division. It is direct evidence 
that political reintegration of once hostile groups is possible. Above all, the socio-
economic sphere offers most opportunities for diminishing the reinforcing effects 
of cleavages. While a smaller part of the recorded socio-economic disparities be-
tween ethnic groups can be considered as inherited from the pre-war era, it is clear 
that most of them are stemming from the nationalist policies that spilled over into 
the socio-economic sphere. Appropriate policies such as structural economic sup-
port and diversification, prevention of depopulation or guaranteeing equal access to 
the public sector have great potential to reverse these inequalities. In sum, from the 
policy point of view, the ‘new’ ideological and socio-political reinforcing cleavages 
should be managed through political moderation and economic equalization with 
the aim of reversal, or at least moderation, of inequalities. Success in these efforts is 
needed for preserving the ethnic heterogeneity and reintegration of society not only 
in the unique areas under our examination, but potentially in any other post-ethnic-
conflict areas in general. 
Turning back to the fundamental question of the prospects for peaceful post-
conflict coexistence of warring ethnic parties, five deviant cases under our exa-
mination clearly repudiate the deterministic argument of the necessity of ethnic 
separation. Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs cohabiting peacefully in Brčko, Glamoč, 
Topusko, Vojnić and Vukosavlje are living evidence that coexistence of once bel-
ligerent groups is possible even after extremely intensive ethnic war and ethnic 
cleansing. However, mere coexistence as such is no guarantee for the long-term 
stability of these areas, as both the theory and the empirical record suggest. Hence, 
the post-conflict peacebuilding strategies of local and international actors shall con-
centrate on identification, moderation and final reversal of those cleavages within 
post-conflict society that reinforce its ethnic divisions. If the peacebuilding process 
overcomes these challenges, a society once divided by war can be reintegrated, its 
internal ties cemented, and prospects for its long-term stability and sustainability 
highly improved.
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